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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Brandon L. Peak*
Joseph M. Colwell**
Christopher B. McDaniel***
Rory A. Weeks****
Ramsey B. Prather*****
and Michael F. Williford******
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses several significant opinions and legislation of
interest to the Georgia civil trial practitioner issued during the survey
period of this publication.1
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II. LEGISLATION
There were several significant bills that were passed or considered by
the Georgia General Assembly this year. Trial practitioners should pay
close attention to the following legislation in particular.
House Bill 2392 created a statewide business court in Georgia.3 The
business court will be a court of limited jurisdiction that is primarily
limited to complex business litigation matters and that excludes claims
such as those for personal injury sounding in tort. 4 As passed, the law
requires the consent of all parties to remove or transfer a case out of
state or superior court into business court.5
There are two other bills that, while they were not passed by the
General Assembly during this legislative session, had the potential to
impact trial practice and procedure in Georgia. Therefore, they are
included in this article in the event that the bills resurface during a
future legislative session.
The first is House Bill 171,6 which would have made the plaintiff’s
failure to wear a seatbelt admissible into evidence at the trial of a carwreck case.7 The bill also would have permitted the jury to apportion
fault to the plaintiff and reduce the plaintiff’s damages awarded due to
the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt. 8 House Bill 171 did not pass a
vote in the General Assembly.
The second is Senate Bill 155,9 which would have limited a plaintiff’s
recovery of damages for medical expenses to the amount paid by an
insurer or other third-party benefits provider, rather than the amount
billed by the medical provider.10 The bill would have made the amount
billed inadmissible as evidence at trial. 11 The bill also would have
allowed a post-verdict motion by the defendant to challenge whether the
plaintiff’s medical providers’ charges exceeded usual and customary
amounts, thereby reducing the damages owed under the verdict,

1. For an analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure during the prior survey
period, see Brandon L. Peak et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 253 (2018).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 239, Reg. Sess. (2019) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-1-14 (2019)).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Ga. H.R. Bill 171, Reg. Sess. (2019) (unenacted).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Ga. S. Bill 155, Reg. Sess. (2019) (unenacted).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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including future damages.12 Senate Bill 155 did not pass out of
committee.
III. CASE LAW
A. Appeals
In Duke v. State,13 the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously
overruled its earlier decision in Waldrip v. Head14 and held that
Georgia’s appellate courts cannot circumvent the requirements of
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-3415 by permitting interlocutory appeals where the trial
court has not granted a certificate of immediate review.16
In Duke, the defendant was accused of malice murder, among other
charges, in connection with Tara Grinstead’s death. The case was set
for trial, and the defendant moved for public funding of experts and
investigators to aid in his defense.17 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b),18
the motions were denied, and the trial court refused to grant Duke a
certificate of immediate review. Despite the failure to obtain a
certificate of immediate review from the trial court, Duke appealed to
the Georgia Supreme Court, arguing the court had appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Waldrip v. Head.19
In Waldrip, the Georgia Supreme Court created an exception to the
statutory limitations on interlocutory appellate review for cases that
involve “an issue of great concern, gravity, and importance to the public
and no timely opportunity for appellate review.”20 This rule allowed
parties to file appeals even where the trial court had denied a certificate
of immediate review.21 In Duke, the court reversed its holding in
Waldrip, holding that the judicially created exception to the
interlocutory appellate process in Waldrip “extended beyond the Court’s
constitutional and statutory authority and [was] based on unsound and
inapposite precedents.”22

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
306 Ga. 171, 829 S.E.2d 348 (2019).
272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (2019).
Duke, 306 Ga. at 171, 829 S.E.2d at 351.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (2019).
Duke, 306 Ga. at 171, 829 S.E.2d at 351.
Waldrip, 272 Ga. at 575, 532 S.E.2d at 384–85.
Id. at 577, 532 S.E.2d at 386.
Duke, 306 Ga. at 183, 829 S.E.2d at 358.
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The court’s rationale for overruling its prior decision in Waldrip was
threefold. First, the court held that the Waldrip rule impermissibly
shifted the authority to decide whether interlocutory appellate review
was warranted from the trial court to the appellate courts. 23 Second, the
court held that Waldrip’s holding was based upon non-binding,
unpersuasive, and inapposite case authority. 24 Third, the court held
that the Waldrip decision wrongly construed the constitutional and
statutory grants of authority to Georgia’s appellate courts to allow the
court to extend its own appellate jurisdiction.25
For these reasons, the court held that Waldrip should be overruled
and that stare decisis did not warrant maintaining Waldrip’s judicially
created exception to the interlocutory appeal process. 26 Although the
court noted that the appellate courts have rarely permitted appellate
review under Waldrip,27 the court determined that it should
nonetheless be overruled because its “reasoning was unsound and
unmoored from [the] Court’s consistent and longstanding application of
statutory appeal requirements enacted by the General Assembly.”28
Parties will no longer be able to rely upon the judicially-created
Waldrip rule to seek interlocutory appeal.29 Rather, parties must follow
the appellate procedures outlined in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 and seek a
certificate of immediate review (or, alternatively, rely upon other
statutory or judicial grounds for interlocutory appeal, such as the
collateral order doctrine, where applicable).30
B. Apportionment
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Loudermilk,31 the
primary holding of the Georgia Supreme Court, in response to three
certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the
23. Id. at 178–79, 829 S.E.2d at 355–56. “Waldrip injected this Court into a role that
the General Assembly entrusted exclusively to the trial court; namely, deciding whether,
in the first instance, an issue merits interlocutory consideration.” Id. at 178, 829 S.E.2d at
355.
24. Id. at 179–81, 183, 829 S.E.2d at 356–58 (impliedly overruling In re Bd. of Twiggs
County Comm’rs, 249 Ga. 642, 292 S.E.2d 673 (1982), on which the Waldrip court relied,
“to the extent it suggests that jurisdictional issues need not be resolved by an appellate
court before it considers the merits of an appeal.”).
25. Id. at 182, 829 S.E.2d at 358.
26. Id. at 184, 829 S.E.2d at 359.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 186, 829 S.E.2d at 360.
30. Id.
31. 305 Ga. 558, 826 S.E.2d 116 (2019).
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Eleventh Circuit, was that Georgia’s apportionment statute does not
abrogate the common law rule imposing joint and several liability on
persons who act in concert in the commission of a tort. 32
In its capacity as the receiver for the Buckhead Community Bank,
the FDIC sued nine of the bank’s former directors and officers under
theories of negligence and gross negligence associated with their
approval of ten commercial real estate loans in Georgia. Before trial,
the defendants requested that the district court instruct the jury to
apportion damages among them if the jury found they were liable. The
district court denied the request, and the defendants renewed the
request during trial, which the district court again denied.33
The jury found the directors and officers were negligent in approving
four of the ten loans and awarded damages of $4,986,993. The district
court entered a final judgment for that amount and the defendants
appealed.34
On appeal, the FDIC argued that even if the apportionment statute
generally abrogated joint and several liability for most torts, joint and
several liability survived where tortfeasors “act in concert.”35 The
Eleventh Circuit then certified the question to the Georgia Supreme
Court, which emphasized that the touchstone of the damages analysis
under Georgia’s apportionment statute is “whether fault is divisible.”36
In comparing the statute’s directive to apportion fault “according to the
percentage of fault of each person” to civil conspiracies, the court
observed that:
true concerted action is predicated on the idea that wrongdoers “in
pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act . . .
are equally liable,” and that through “joint enterprise” and “mutual
agency . . . the act of one is the act of all.” Under that legal theory,
where the act (and thus the fault) of one person is imputed to all

32. Id. at 569, 826 S.E.2d at 124–25. The court also held that Georgia’s
apportionment statute applies to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank
directors and officers because, the court reasoned, the language of the phrase in
subsection (b) “for injury to person or property,” includes intangible property: “We . . .
adopt the usual and customary meaning of the term ‘property,’ as used in a legal context,
and conclude that ‘injury to person or property’ in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) includes both
tortious injuries to tangible and intangible property.” Id. at 566, 826 S.E.2d at 122–23.
The court declined to answer the Eleventh Circuit’s third certified question of whether the
decision of a bank’s board of directors constituted “concerted action.” Id. at 576, 826
S.E.2d at 129.
33. Id. at 558–59, 826 S.E.2d at 117–18.
34. Id. at 559, 826 S.E.2d at 118.
35. Id. at 560, 826 S.E.2d at 118.
36. Id. at 572, 826 S.E.2d at 126.
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other members of the same joint enterprise, “liability for all that is
done is visited upon each.” And where the fault of one person is
legally imputed to another person who is part of the same joint
enterprise, we cannot say that there is a legal means of dividing fault
“among the persons who are liable.”37

Because the entirety of the “fault” of tortfeasors who “act in concert”
was imputed to each bad actor, the court concluded there was no way to
divide that fault among them.38 Thus:
Georgia’s apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33,39 did not
abrogate Georgia’s common-law rule imposing joint and several
liability on persons who act in concert. We emphasize, however, that
this holding encompasses only traditional concerted action, as it was
understood at common law, for the basic reason that fault in such
scenarios is not divisible.40

In Trabue v. Atlanta Women’s Specialists, LLC,41 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that apportionment was not proper between an
employer and a nonparty physician where the basis of the employer’s
liability for the actions of the physician–employee who was a party to
the suit is solely vicarious, and the defendant–employer failed to give
the 120-day notice required by Georgia’s apportionment statute to
apportion fault to the nonparty physician. 42
The plaintiffs sued Atlanta Women’s Specialists (AWS) and one of its
physician–employees in Fulton County State Court, alleging AWS was
liable for the catastrophic brain injury the primary plaintiff’s spouse
suffered after being admitted to the hospital for induction of labor.43
The plaintiffs asserted no direct liability claim against AWS, instead
alleging that AWS was vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of
both the physician–employee named as a defendant as well as the
nonparty physician–employee not named as a defendant, a fact to which
AWS stipulated.44 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $46 million and the
37. Id. at 572–73, 826 S.E.2d at 127 (internal citations omitted) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 46, 52 (5th ed. 1984)).
.
38 Id. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 129.
39. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2019).
40. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 129.
41. 349 Ga. App. 223, 825 S.E.2d 586 (2019).
42. Id. at 232, 825 S.E.2d at 594. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d) provides: “Negligence or
fault of a nonparty shall be considered if . . . a defending party gives notice not later than
120 days prior to the date of trial that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault.”
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)(1) (2019).
43. Trabue, 349 Ga. App. at 223, 825 S.E.2d at 588.
44. Id. at 231, 825 S.E.2d at 593–94.
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defendants moved for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that the
trial court erred because it did not require the jury to apportion fault
between the named physician–employee and AWS based on the alleged
relative fault of the nonparty physician–employee.45 The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion and ordered a new trial on the issue of
apportionment only.46
The defendants sought and received a certificate of immediate review
from the trial court.47 The court of appeals granted their petition for an
interlocutory appeal and reversed the order granting a new trial on the
issue of apportionment because “fault,” as used in Georgia’s
apportionment statute, only extends to those who “‘have breached a
legal duty in the nature of a tort that is owed for the protection of the
plaintiff, the breach of which is a proximate cause of his injury.’” 48
Because AWS’s liability for the torts of its employees was purely
vicarious in nature, and because the plaintiffs had not alleged any
independent breach by AWS, there was no basis to conclude that AWS
had “breached a legal duty in the nature of a tort,” thus making
apportionment inappropriate.49 Further, AWS’s failure to provide the
statutorily required notice of its intent to apportion fault to its nonparty
employee meant the nonparty could not appear on the verdict form. 50
The defendants were not allowed to apportion fault to any nonparty. 51
C. Attorney’s Fees
In Showan v. Pressdee,52 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(e),53 which
governs awards of attorney’s fees when a party has asserted a frivolous
claim or defense, “[a] district court has no discretion to decline [a]
prevailing party’s request [for a hearing in front of the jury] if the party
makes” such a request.54
45. Id. at 223, 825 S.E.2d at 588.
46. Id. at 227, 825 S.E.2d at 590.
47. Id. at 227, 825 S.E.2d at 591.
48. Id. at 231, 825 S.E.2d at 594 (quoting Johnson St. Props., LLC v. Clure, 302 Ga.
51, 58, 805 S.E.2d 60, 68 (2017)).
49. Id. at 231–32, 825 S.E.2d at 594.
50. Id. at 232, 825 S.E.2d at 594.
51. Id.
52. 922 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2019). Despite being a case from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Authors have included this opinion because it
interprets an important Georgia statutory provision regarding attorney’s fees awardable
for bad faith and represents important persuasive authority on that statute.
53. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(e) (2019).
54. Showan, 922 F.3d at 1227. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(e) provides, in relevant part:
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In Showan, the plaintiff was rear-ended by a Krispy Kreme delivery
truck while stopped at a red light and was seriously injured. 55 Eight
days after the wreck, Krispy Kreme issued a “corrective action report”
to its driver stating that the driver was “at fault” for the wreck. 56 Less
than two weeks after the wreck, a Krispy Kreme insurance claim
summary was prepared that stated the plaintiff “was ‘0%’ negligent.”57
Despite these facts, the defendants (Krispy Kreme and its driver)
asserted in their answers that the defendants had “breached no duty to”
the plaintiff.58 The defendants also refused to admit in discovery
responses “that [the driver’s] actions caused or contributed to the
collision or that [the plaintiff] suffered injuries.” 59 However, “shortly
before trial” the defendants obtained permission to amend their
answers in order to “admit significant liability of which [the defendants
had] arguably been aware since the collision at issue.”60
Following a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff
requested a hearing under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(e) so that the jury could
determine whether the defendants had asserted frivolous defenses and,
if so, to what extent the plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees. 61 The
district court denied the plaintiff’s request, reasoning that “‘as a matter
of law’ . . . the [defendants’] pleadings were not frivolous.” 62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed.63 The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s refusal to
give the plaintiff a hearing in front of the jury that served as factfinder
with respect to the merits of the plaintiff’s liability case constituted
reversible error.64 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-68(e) required the district court to give the plaintiff a hearing in
Upon motion by the prevailing party at the time that the verdict or judgment is
rendered, the moving party may request that the finder of fact determine
whether the opposing party presented a frivolous claim or defense. In such
event, the court shall hold a separate bifurcated hearing at which the finder of
fact shall make a determination of whether such frivolous claims or defenses
were asserted and to award damages, if any, against the party presenting such
frivolous claims or defenses.
Id.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Showan, 922 F.3d at 1213–14.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227–28.
Id. at 1228.
Id.
Id.
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front of the jury after she requested one because the statute “uses the
mandatory ‘shall’ in describing the court’s obligation to hold the
bifurcated hearing upon the party’s motion” and “[t]he word ‘shall’ is
ordinarily ‘[t]he language of command.’”65 Further, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the district court had no authority to determine that the
defendants’ pleadings were not frivolous as a matter of law.66 As the
Eleventh Circuit held, “Georgia has made clear that such a
determination is for the finder of fact. It has also made clear that the
prevailing party has a right to a hearing if it requests one.” 67
D. Damages
In Bibbs v. Toyota Motor Corp.,68 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia posed two certified questions to the
Georgia Supreme Court:
Under Georgia law, are the damages that may be recovered in a
wrongful death action brought by survivors of a decedent limited by a
settlement entered into by the decedent’s guardian in a previous
personal injury suit settling all claims that were or could have been
asserted in that suit?

If the answer is yes, what components of wrongful death damages are
barred?69
The Georgia Supreme Court answered each of those questions by
holding (1) “damages in a wrongful death action are limited by the
decedent’s full settlement of her earlier personal injury action” 70 and (2)
“damages recovered or recoverable in an earlier personal injury lawsuit
[are barred and] cannot be recovered again in a wrongful death suit.” 71

65. Id. at 1227.
66. Id. at 1228.
67. Id.
68. 304 Ga. 68, 815 S.E.2d 850 (2018).
69. Id. at 68, 815 S.E.2d at 852.
70. Id. at 80, 815 S.E.2d at 859 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 68, 815 S.E.2d at 852. The case’s relevant facts stem back more than two
decades. Delia Bibbs suffered a serious head injury in a car wreck in 1992. While Mrs.
Bibbs was in a coma as a result of the wreck, her husband brought a personal injury
lawsuit on her behalf against Toyota, the manufacturer of the car, alleging that a defect
in the car caused Mrs. Bibbs’ injuries. Id. at 69, 815 S.E.2d at 852. Mr. Bibbs ultimately
entered into a settlement agreement “releas[ing] Toyota from all ‘claims’ and ‘damages’
arising from the accident,” while “[e]xpressly exclud[ing] from the release ‘any claim for
Delia Bibbs’ wrongful death . . . .’” Id. Mrs. Bibbs never awoke from her coma and
subsequently died more than twenty years later. After her death, the subject lawsuit was
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In reaching its conclusion, the court analyzed the history and
development of Georgia’s wrongful death law.72 The court noted that
“wrongful death damages and personal injury damages are often
distinguishable, but sometimes overlap, and where they do [overlap],
double recovery is impermissible.” 73 Based on the facts presented in
Bibbs, the court concluded that there was “substantial overlap between
the damages for future losses recoverable in personal injury and the
damages recoverable in wrongful death.” 74 The court concluded on these
facts that the full value of Mrs. Bibbs’s economic damages were
recoverable at the time of her personal injury settlement and could
therefore not be recovered again in the wrongful death suit. 75
E. Discovery, Evidence, and Sanctions
In Anglin v. Smith,76 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
court’s decision to exclude an affidavit from evidence at trial on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to produce or identify the affidavit
during discovery.77 Anglin was a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff
received two separate injections from the defendant to treat lower back
pain.78 After the second round of injections, the plaintiff allegedly
suffered “weakness and pain in her lower extremities, such that she
was unable to stand, as well as urinary incontinence.”79
A key issue at trial was when the defendant allegedly learned of
these complications and what actions the defendant took in response to
learning about them. The plaintiff called her employer as a witness at
trial to testify about a phone conversation the employer had with the
plaintiff following the second round of injections. The employer could
not remember the precise details of the phone call, so the plaintiff’s
counsel attempted to refresh the employer’s recollection with an
affidavit plaintiff’s counsel had obtained from the employer.80

filed by Mr. Bibbs and the surviving children of Mrs. Bibbs seeking to recover from Toyota
the full value of the life of Mrs. Bibbs as a result of her wrongful death. Id.
72. Id. at 70–75, 815 S.E.2d at 853–56.
73. Id. at 79–80, 815 S.E.2d at 859.
74. Id. at 79, 815 S.E.2d at 858–59.
75. Id. at 80, 815 S.E.2d at 859.
76. 346 Ga. App. 456, 816 S.E.2d 426 (2018).
77. Id. at 457, 462, 463–64, 816 S.E.2d at 428, 431–32.
78. Id. at 456–57, 816 S.E.2d at 428.
79. Id. at 458, 816 S.E.2d at 429.
80. Id. at 458–60, 816 S.E.2d at 429–30.
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The defendant objected to use of the affidavit because it had not been
identified or produced by the plaintiff during discovery. 81 The trial court
sustained the objection and disallowed the plaintiff from using the
affidavit as a sanction.82 The court of appeals affirmed this ruling,
holding “no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that
the existence of [the employer’s] affidavit should have been disclosed to
the defense even though the affidavit was given after the plaintiffs’
initial responses to the defendant’s interrogatories.”83 The court held
that because “the plaintiffs’ counsel clearly intended to use [the
employer’s] affidavit at trial to support the allegation that [defendant]
was aware of the pain and other difficulties [plaintiff] was experiencing
two days following the second injection,” the plaintiff had a clear duty
under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(e)(2)(B)84 to, at a minimum, identify the
affidavit in a supplemental response to defendant’s discovery
responses.85 Trial practitioners should be cautioned by this opinion that
even where a party may have a valid work-product objection to
producing a witness affidavit, the failure to identify such affidavits in
response to discovery requests (on a privilege log, for example) may
result in exclusion of such evidence at trial as a sanction.
F. Dismissal and Renewal
In Wentz v. Emory Healthcare, Inc.,86 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that a trial court did not have the power to later convert a
plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal into a dismissal with prejudice.87
George Wentz sued Emory Healthcare for medical malpractice and,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1,88 attached an expert affidavit to his
original complaint.89 Emory Healthcare filed a motion to dismiss,

81. Id. at 460, 816 S.E.2d at 430. Both the court of appeals and trial court determined
the affidavit was responsive to defendant’s discovery requests. See id. at 461, 816 S.E.2d
at 431.
82. Id. at 460, 816 S.E.2d at 430.
83. Id. at 461, 816 S.E.2d at 431.
84. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(e)(2)(B) (2019).
85. Anglin, 346 Ga. App. at 461–62, 816 S.E.2d at 431. The court of appeals did not
address the substance of the plaintiff’s work-product objection, holding that regardless of
whether the plaintiff’s work-product objection had merit or not, the plaintiff was still
under an obligation to identify the affidavit in discovery, at which point the trial court
could have addressed the work-product objection if challenged by the defendant. See id. at
462 n.5, 816 S.E.2d at 431 n.5.
86. 347 Ga. App. 302, 819 S.E.2d 296 (2018).
87. Id. at 305, 819 S.E.2d at 299.
88. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2019).
89. Wentz, 347 Ga. App. at 302, 819 S.E.2d at 297.
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arguing that Wentz’s expert affidavit was insufficient because, as
required by O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c),90 it failed to set forth the expert’s
experience. While that motion was pending, Wentz voluntarily
dismissed his case.91 Emory Healthcare filed a motion to strike Wentz’s
dismissal and argued that, because Wentz failed to amend his expert
affidavit within thirty days of the complaint, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-9.1(e),92 the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.93 Wentz
refiled and renewed his case with an updated expert affidavit. Emory
Healthcare argued that the renewal action was barred by res judicata
because Wentz’s original suit could only have been dismissed with
prejudice under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e).94
Five months after Wentz’s voluntary dismissal, the trial court
entered an order that converted Wentz’s original dismissal to a
dismissal with prejudice and dismissed the renewal action. 95 The trial
court found that Wentz “‘had no absolute right to voluntarily dismiss
[the] prior suit without prejudice under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a),’96 and
that ‘by operation of law, the earlier dismissal was with prejudice, and
the renewal action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.’”97
The court of appeals reversed and held O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e) gave
the trial court the discretion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice but
that discretion was not absolute: “it requires the trial court to take
action while the case is still pending.” 98 The trial court had not taken
action on Emory Healthcare’s motion before Wentz dismissed his case. 99
The court of appeals held that the voluntary dismissal concluded the
first action and emphasized that a failure to timely amend an expert
90. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c) (2019).
91. Wentz, 347 Ga. App. at 302, 819 S.E.2d at 297.
92. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e) (2019). The statute provides:
If a plaintiff files an affidavit which is allegedly defective, and the defendant to
whom it pertains alleges, with specificity, by motion to dismiss filed on or
before the close of discovery, that said affidavit is defective, the plaintiff’s
complaint shall be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, except that
the plaintiff may cure the alleged defect by amendment pursuant to Code
Section 9-11-15 within 30 days of service of the motion alleging that the
affidavit is defective. The trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
extend the time for filing said amendment or response to the motion, or both,
as it shall determine justice requires.
Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Wentz, 347 Ga. App. at 302–03, 819 S.E.2d at 297.
Id.
Id. at 303, 819 S.E.2d at 297–98.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a) (2019).
Wentz, 347 Ga. App. at 303, 819 S.E.2d at 297–98.
Id. at 304–05, 819 S.E.2d at 298–99.
Id. at 304, 819 S.E.2d at 298.

[16] TRIAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE- BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

TRIAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

11/26/2019 11:21 AM

317

affidavit under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e) is not an incurable defect that
prevents a plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing his case without
prejudice.100 The court of appeals distinguished Chatham Orthopaedic
Surgery Center, LLC v. Georgia Alliance of Community Hospitals,
Inc.,101 because dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)102 is mandatory
(the claim “shall be stricken”) and dismissal under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-9.1(e) is discretionary (the “complaint shall be subject to
dismissal”).103 Finally, the court of appeals held that, because Wentz’s
voluntary dismissal was effective and final, his renewal action was not
barred by res judicata.104
G. Jurisdiction and Venue
In Carpenter v. McMann,105 the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously
held that, where a Georgia resident and an unknown driver are alleged
to be joint tortfeasors who caused injuries during a traffic collision,
venue is proper in the county in which the traffic collision occurred.106
The court’s opinion was based on a plain reading of the venue
provision of the uninsured motorist statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d)(1),107
and the state constitutional venue provision108 for suits involving joint
tortfeasors.109 Under the uninsured motorist statute, a person injured
in a traffic collision may sue the unknown defendant as “John Doe” and
choose whether “John Doe” resides in either the “county in which the
accident causing injury or damages occurred” or the county in which the
plaintiff resides.110 Under the Georgia Constitution, venue is proper
against joint tortfeasors who “resid[e] in different counties . . . in either
county.”111 Reading these rules together, the court in Carpenter held
that the Georgia defendant was not entitled to a change of venue to his
home county.112

100. Id. at 305, 819 S.E.2d at 299.
101. 262 Ga. App. 353, 585 S.E.2d 700 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Berryhill
v. Georgia Cmty. Support and Sols., Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 638 S.E.2d 278 (2006).
102. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b) (2019).
103. Wentz, 347 Ga. App. at 304–05, 819 S.E.2d at 298–99.
104. Id. at 306, 819 S.E.2d at 299.
105. 304 Ga. 209, 817 S.E.2d 686 (2018).
106. Id. at 210, 817 S.E.2d at 688.
107. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d)(1) (2019).
108. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 4.
109. See Carpenter, 304 Ga. at 210, 817 S.E.2d at 688.
110. Id.
111. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 4.
112. Carpenter, 304 Ga. at 212–13, 817 S.E.2d at 689–90.
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In Pascarelli v. Koehler,113 the Georgia Court of Appeals considered
the propriety of personal jurisdiction based on internet contacts with
the state.114 In April 2012, Frank Pascarelli, who lived in Marietta,
Georgia, traveled to Casper, Wyoming for business. Pascarelli worked
for the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).115 In choosing a hotel in
Casper, Pascarelli based his decision on the hotel’s status as a
“preferred hotel” with the CDC and amenities apparent on the
website.116 The hotel Pascarelli chose was a franchise of Marriot
International, Inc., owned, operated, and managed by James Koehler, a
South Dakota resident.117
After his first night at the hotel, Pascarelli awoke with “an enormous
amount” of bed bug bites.118 He went to an urgent care facility in
Wyoming twice to get treatment. When he returned to Georgia, he
ended up in the hospital for two weeks because his wounds became
infected with MRSA.119
In March 2014, Pascarelli and his wife sued Marriott International,
Inc., Koehler,120 and other business entities associated with Koehler’s
hotel. The defendants collectively moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and the trial court granted that motion with respect to
each defendant except franchisor Marriott International.121
On appeal, the key question was whether Koehler, a South Dakota
resident, had established sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia for
purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. 122 The court began its
analysis by acknowledging that the Georgia long-arm statute does not
require physical presence in this state and that “‘long-arm jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants [can be] based on business conducted
through postal, telephonic, and Internet contacts.’” 123 Turning to
Koehler’s conduct, the court noted that he did not operate an
independent website for his hotel and that he focused his independent

113. 346 Ga. App. 591, 816 S.E.2d 723 (2018).
114. Id. at 592–93, 816 S.E.2d at 725.
115. Id. at 592, 816 S.E.2d at 724–25.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 594, 816 S.E.2d at 726.
118. Id. at 592, 816 S.E.2d at 725.
119. Id.
120. Id. Koehler was doing business as Courtyard Casper’s. Id. at 591, 816 S.E.2d at
724.
121. Id. at 592, 816 S.E.2d at 725.
122. See id. at 591, 816 S.E.2d at 724.
123. Id. at 594, 816 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Paxton v. Citizens Bank & Tr. of W. Ga.,
307 Ga. App. 112, 116, 704 S.E.2d 215, 219 (2010)).
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advertising in Wyoming and Colorado.124 Koehler did, however, put
information about his hotel on a website run by Marriott International
for its franchises. He also paid to Marriott International, under his
franchise agreement, a percentage of room revenue into a marketing
fund. Marriott International used that fund to pay for television
commercials and digital advertising of several Marriott International
brands but not any specific franchise hotel. Evidence in the record
showed that from 2010 to 2013, Koehler’s hotel generated about $40,000
in revenue from Georgia residents, less than one percent of each year’s
total revenue. The Marriott International website used a centralized
booking and reservation system. 125
The court of appeals noted that whether personal jurisdiction exists
based on online activity is based on a “sliding-scale” analysis of the
underlying internet activity.126 On one end of the scale are people or
entities who are plainly doing business over the internet. At the other
end of the scale are people or entities who have simply posted material
on the internet that is accessible. 127 In the middle are “interactive”
websites, which allow users to exchange information with the source
computer.128
The Marriott International website, the court concluded, was
“neither entirely passive nor entirely interactive.” 129 So, to determine
whether personal jurisdiction was proper, the court had to analyze “‘the
level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site.’” 130 The court distinguished
hotel reservation websites from websites where goods are ordered and
then delivered to Georgia.131 According to the court, goods-selling
websites fulfill their purpose when the goods are delivered in Georgia,
whereas hotel-reservation websites fulfill their purpose when a room is
rented outside the state.132 The court noted that several courts in other
jurisdictions had concluded that operation of a hotel reservation website
did not create sufficient minimum contacts to permit specific personal
jurisdiction over the hotel.133 Finding those decisions persuasive, the
124. Id.
125. Id. at 594, 816 S.E.2d at 726.
126. Id. at 595, 816 S.E.2d at 726–27.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 595, 816 S.E.2d at 727.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 522, 631 S.E.2d
734, 740 (2006)).
131. Id. at 596–97, 816 S.E.2d at 727.
132. Id. at 597, 816 S.E.2d at 727.
133. Id. at 597, 816 S.E.2d at 728.
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court held that Koehler’s internet contacts with Georgia (which were
solely via Marriott International) were insufficient to support personal
jurisdiction where the underlying tortious conduct occurred outside of
Georgia.134
H. Jury Instructions
In Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C. v. Quinney,135 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that, in a medical malpractice action, it
is proper for a trial court to instruct the jury that, in order for a
defendant to apportion fault to a nonparty emergency medical provider,
the defendant has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the nonparty emergency medical provider was grossly
negligent in his or her care of the plaintiff. 136
The plaintiff in Quinney went to the emergency room, presenting
with severe back pain, five days after undergoing surgery to have a
spinal-cord stimulator placed in his back to relieve pain related to
diabetic neuropathy. The plaintiff was treated by several healthcare
providers at the emergency room, but none of those healthcare
providers determined the cause of the plaintiff’s severe back pain. After
the plaintiff was transferred to a different hospital, the plaintiff was
diagnosed with a spinal canal hematoma that had been compressing the
plaintiff’s spine.
Although a surgeon immediately removed the
hematoma, the damage to the plaintiff’s spine was already done: the
plaintiff was irreversibly paralyzed from the waist down.137
The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the
physician who treated him in the emergency room. 138 During the charge
conference, the defendant physician “advocated for the trial court to
instruct the jury to apply an ordinary-negligence standard of care in
apportioning fault to non-part[y]” healthcare providers such as the
nonparty radiologist and the nurses who also treated the plaintiff in the
emergency room.139 The trial court rejected this request, ruling that “it
would instruct the jury to apply the gross-negligence standard for
apportioning fault to any non-party [that] provid[ed] [the plaintiff] with
emergency care.”140 The trial court based this ruling on O.C.G.A.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
347 Ga. App. 410, 819 S.E.2d 696 (2018).
Id. at 418–19, 819 S.E.2d at 704.
Id. at 411–12, 819 S.E.2d at 698–99.
Id. at 412, 819 S.E.2d at 699.
Id. at 421, 819 S.E.2d at 705.
Id.
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§ 51-1-29.5,141 which provides, in pertinent part, that “no physician or
health care provider [who has provided emergency medical care in a
hospital emergency department] shall be held liable unless it is proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the physician or health care
provider’s actions showed gross negligence.”142
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 143 The court of
appeals reasoned that in order for the defendant physician to apportion
fault to non-party healthcare providers who treated the plaintiff in the
emergency room, the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 required
any party attempting to establish the liability of an emergency room
healthcare provider to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the
emergency room healthcare provider’s actions (with respect to the
plaintiff) constituted gross negligence.144 This burden applies equally to
a defendant attempting to apportion fault to a non-party emergency
room healthcare provider as it does to a plaintiff attempting to establish
liability against an emergency room healthcare provider who is a
defendant in the case.145
In Berryhill v. Daly,146 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a jury
verdict in favor of the defendant in a medical malpractice case after
concluding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury with
respect to assumption of the risk.147
The plaintiff in Berryhill was prescribed blood pressure medication
and underwent a related surgical procedure performed by the plaintiff’s
cardiologist. Five days after the surgical procedure, the plaintiff fainted
after climbing to the top of a deer stand and was seriously injured when
he fell. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the
cardiologist contending that the cardiologist had prescribed too much
blood pressure medication. The trial court instructed the jury with
respect to assumption of the risk. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the defendant–cardiologist.148
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury with respect to assumption of the risk. 149 The court
of appeals agreed, explaining that “‘a defendant asserting an

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 (2019).
Quinney, 347 Ga. App. at 421, 819 S.E.2d at 705 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5).
Id. at 410, 819 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 421, 819 S.E.2d at 705.
Id. at 425–26, 819 S.E.2d at 708.
348 Ga. App. 221, 822 S.E.2d 30 (2018).
Id. at 223, 822 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 222, 822 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 223, 822 S.E.2d at 32–33.
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assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had
actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the
risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself
to those risks.’”150 The court of appeals held that the defendant failed to
introduce “evidence establishing the first element necessary for an
instruction on assumption of the risk.” 151 Although “the record
suggest[ed] that [the cardiologist] advised [the plaintiff] not to engage
in any strenuous activity[, the record did] not establish that [the
plaintiff] knew he risked losing consciousness if he chose to disregard
[the cardiologist’s] instructions.”152 Further, the record was devoid of
“any evidence . . . that [the plaintiff] knew that dizziness or loss of
consciousness was a possible side effect of [the plaintiff’s] blood
pressure medication.”153 Because the plaintiff did not have “actual
knowledge of the danger” that he faced with respect to taking the blood
pressure medication, the jury instruction regarding assumption of the
risk “should not have been given.”154 The trial court’s decision to give
the assumption of the risk instruction constituted reversible error
because the instruction “could have confused the jury into believing
that any risk [as opposed to the risk associated with taking the blood
pressure medication] assumed by [the plaintiff] could have formed the
basis for a finding of no liability.”155
I. Offers of Judgment
In Hillman v. Bord,156 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
settlement offer under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a)157 was valid even though
the offer was conditioned on the release of a party’s equitable claims for
injunctive relief.158 The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court’s
ruling that the settlement offers were made in good faith and held that
the award of fees was not an abuse of discretion. 159
Daniel and Amy Hillman sued their next-door neighbors, alleging
their property had been damaged by a newly constructed retaining wall

150. Id. at 223, 822 S.E.2d at 33 (quoting Vaughn v. Protective Ins. Co., 243 Ga. App.
79, 81, 532 S.E.2d 159, 162 (2000)).
151. Id. at 224, 822 S.E.2d at 33.
152. Id. at 223–24, 822 S.E.2d at 33.
153. Id. at 224, 822 S.E.2d at 33.
154. Id. at 223–24, 822 S.E. 2d at 33.
155. Id. at 224, 822 S.E.2d at 33.
156. 347 Ga. App. 651, 820 S.E.2d 482 (2018) (physical precedent only).
157. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a) (2019).
158. Hillman, 347 Ga. App. at 657–58, 820 S.E.2d at 489.
159. Id. at 655, 820 S.E.2d at 487.
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that caused increased water runoff onto the Hillmans’ property. 160 The
defendants made two separate offers to settle the case, first for $4,000
and then $41,000. Both offers were conditioned on the release of all the
plaintiffs’ claims in tort and in equity.161 After a five-day jury trial, the
jury found on behalf of the defendants as to the plaintiffs’ claims. 162
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the settlement offers were invalid 163
because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a) provides only for the settlement of tort
claims and does not allow for the inclusion of equitable claims in a valid
offer.164
The majority disagreed and took an expansive view of the
requirement in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a)(4)165 that a settlement offer must
“[s]tate with particularity any relevant conditions.” 166 Agreeing with the
trial court, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs’ claims for
equitable injunctive relief were a “relevant condition” of the settlement
offer under the statute because the plaintiffs’ claims were intertwined
with and “premised entirely on the allegations . . . in [their] tort
claims.”167 The majority cited to Canton Plaza, Inc. v. Regions Bank

160. Id. at 651, 820 S.E.2d at 485.
161. Id. at 656–57, 820 S.E.2d at 487–88.
162. Id. at 652, 820 S.E.2d at 485.
163. Id. at 651, 820 S.E.2d at 485.
164. Id. at 654, 820 S.E.2d at 487. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a) states:
(a) At any time more than 30 days after the service of a summons and
complaint on a party but not less than 30 days (or 20 days if it is a
counteroffer) before trial, either party may serve upon the other party, but
shall not file with the court, a written offer, denominated as an offer under this
Code section, to settle a tort claim for the money specified in the offer and to
enter into an agreement dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be
entered accordingly. Any offer under this Code section must:
(1) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this Code section;
(2) Identify the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to
whom the proposal is being made;
(3) Identify generally the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;
(4) State with particularity any relevant conditions;
(5) State the total amount of the proposal;
(6) State with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive
damages, if any;
(7) State whether the proposal includes attorney’s fees or other expenses and
whether attorney’s fees or other expenses are part of the legal claim; and
(8) Include a certificate of service and be served by certified mail or statutory
overnight delivery in the form required by Code Section 9-11-5.
Id.
165. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a)(4) (2019).
166. Hillman, 347 Ga. App. at 653, 820 S.E.2d at 486 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-68(a)(4)).
167. Id. at 655, 820 S.E.2d at 487.
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Inc.168 for the proposition that in a fee-award determination under
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68169 with tort and non-tort claims, the court could
properly subsume non-tort claims with the tort claims where the
non-tort claim is “premised entirely” on the tort claim.170
Presiding Judge Anne Elizabeth Barnes dissented and would have
held the settlement offer—including equitable claims—invalid by the
terms of the statute because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 “applies only to offers
seeking to settle tort damages claims.”171 Presiding Judge Barnes also
would not have construed the term “any relevant conditions” to include
a claim for non-monetary relief because such an expansion is
inconsistent with the rule of strict construction and should properly
come from the legislature.172
Plaintiffs also argued the settlement offers were made in bad faith
because the first offer was too low and the second offer was unclear as
to whether it included the equitable claims. 173 The majority disagreed,
determining on the first claim that defendants had a reasonable belief
that they had strong defenses to liability and limited exposure. 174 On
the second claim, the majority quoted the language of the settlement
offer and determined that the requirement of dismissal of “all claims”
was sufficiently clear to identify both the tort and equitable claim in the
case.175
J. Statutes of Limitations
In Tenet Healthsystem GB, Inc. v. Thomas,176 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that a new legal theory asserted in an amended complaint
after the statute of limitations had expired, as it related back to the
date of the original complaint pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c),177 was
not time-barred.178 The plaintiff’s original complaint alleged

168. 325 Ga. App. 361, 749 S.E.2d 825 (2013).
169. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2019).
170. Hillman, 347 Ga. App. at 654–55, 820 S.E.2d at 487. Canton Plaza, a decision
joined by Presiding Judge Barnes, involved a contract claim and a tort claim. 325 Ga.
App. at 362, 749 S.E.2d at 826.
171. Hillman, 347 Ga. App. at 660, 820 S.E.2d at 490 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 656–57, 820 S.E.2d at 488–89 (majority opinion).
174. Id. at 657, 820 S.E.2d at 488.
175. Id. at 657–58, 820 S.E.2d at 489.
176. 304 Ga. 86, 816 S.E.2d 627 (2018).
177. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (2019).
178. Tenet Healthsystem GB, Inc., 304 Ga. at 93, 816 S.E.2d at 632. O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-15(c) provides:
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professional negligence against two doctors and also asserted a
vicarious liability claim against the hospital for the negligent acts and
omissions of those two doctors.179 After the statute of limitations
expired, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding a
vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the negligence of
a nursing employee, which was not alleged in the original complaint. 180
In evaluating whether the newly asserted claim was time-barred, the
court noted that “[t]he very purpose of [O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c)] is to
qualify a statute of limitations.”181 The court then examined whether
the factual allegations in the original complaint and the new imputed
liability claim alleged in the second amended complaint “are close in
time, place, and subject matter, and involve events leading up to the
same injury.”182 The court concluded there were “close factual
connections between the relevant allegations” such that “they amounted
to a single ‘episode-in-suit,’ sharing a ‘common core of operative
facts.’”183 Accordingly, the court held “[t]he fact that [plaintiff]’s second
amended complaint invoked a legal theory . . . that was not in the
original complaint does not prevent [the plaintiff’s] new claim from
relating back” to the date of the original complaint. 184

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arises out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back to the date of the original pleadings if the foregoing provisions are
satisfied, and if within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such
notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in
maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action
would have been brought against him.
Id.
179. Tenet Healthsystem GB, Inc., 304 Ga. at 87, 816 S.E.2d at 628–29.
180. Id. at 87–88, 816 S.E.2d at 629. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s new
imputed liability claim as time-barred based on its “finding that the original complaint
was ‘devoid of allegations of liability on the part of the hospital nursing staff’’’ and,
therefore, did not relate back to the date of the original complaint. Id. at 88, 816 S.E.2d at
629. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling. Id. The supreme court affirmed
the decision by the court of appeals. Id. at 93, 816 S.E.2d at 632–33.
181. Id. at 90, 816 S.E.2d at 630 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 91, 816 S.E.2d at 631 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 92, 816 S.E.2d at 632.
184. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The above cases and legislation have, in the Authors’ estimation,
most significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia
during the survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be
exhaustive of all legal developments for this topic.

